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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'\TESTERN ENGINEERS, INC.- ,. 
}~D'V ARDS AND KELCEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs 1 Case No. 
. . 10919 
STA TE OF UTAH, by and through ) 
its ROAD COJ.\TMISSION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants' action originally included a number 
of claims for extra compensation under a written 
"Agreement for Engineering Services". Before pretrial 
all had been settled except a claim for damages on 
account of delays during performance of the contract. 
At the pretrial conference, held three and one-half 
years after commencement of the action, respondent 
ornlly moved for summary judgment, and thereafter 
both parties filed formal motions and affidavits. On 
1 
April 25, 1967, the trial court denied appellants' motion 
for summary judgment, granted respondent's, and en-
tered judgment dismissing the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Western Engineers, Inc., a Utah cor-
poration, and Edwards and Kelcey, a New Jersey 
partnership, entered into a joint venture arrangement 
(R. 80) and will be referred to herein as the "joint 
venture." By letter dated November 18, 1957, they 
sent respondent (hereinafter called the "Road Com-
mission") a proposal for the performance of engineer-
ing services for 18.6 miles of Highway Interstate 15, 
the services to include surveys, preliminary design, sub-
surface investigations, final design, preparation of con-
tract plans and specifications, right-of-way maps and 
shop drawings, and field consultations during construc-
tion (R. 75-77). The proposal contained, among others, 
the following undertakings: 
"After approval of preliminary design by the 
Commission and U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, 
complete final design and prepare plans, speci-
fications and contract documents for four con-
struction contracts to be let by the Commission. 
* * * ,, 
2 
".Final design will be in accordance with Road 
Commission standards and design criteria for 
interstate highways approved by U. S. Bureau 
of Public Roads" (R. 76). 
"'¥ e will complete all contract plans and speci-
fications within 9 months after notice to proceed, 
provided that there is not more than a two-week 
interval between submission of the various phases 
of the design to the Commission and approval 
of the above designs by the Commission and the 
Bureau of Public Roads. A time schedule show-
ing completion time for each phase of the work 
is attached." (R. 77). 
"The final fee will be three and forty-five 
hundredths percent ( 3.45%) of the total cost 
of construction. For the purpose of the progress 
payments, the fee is estimated to be 3.45% of 
an estimated construction cost of $19,000,000" 
(R. 77). 
'¥ith the letter the joint venture sent detailed 
information on the qualifications of its principals. The 
biographical data makes it clear that the joint venturers, 
their "associated" corporations, and their managers 
were experienced and knowledgeable, having performed 
a wide variety of services in the field of civil engineering 
on federal and state highways, bridges and other struc-
tures; toll turnpikes and facilities; traffic problems and 
parking facilities; flood control and drainage; water 
supply and sanitation; dams, reservoirs; foundation and 
soils; transit; railroads; subways and tunnels. During 
the five years preceding submission of the proposal, 
Edwards and Kelcey had processed preliminary design 
on highway projects with an estimated construction 
3 
cost of $7 50,000,000, and had prepared final design 
and contract plans for highway projects totaling $120,-
000,000. Other highway design had been done by the 
associated corporations, Engineering Service Corpora-
tion and Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (R. 80-89). 
As a result of the proposal, the joint venture and 
the Road Commission entered into an "Agreement for 
Engineering Services" dated February 21, 1967 (Ex. 
D-1, R. 60-70). 
The contract recited that the Road Commission 
"in cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads'' 
proposed to construct a portion of the Interstate 15 
under three separate project designations totalling 18.6 
miles, and that the Road Commission "does not have 
and cannot recruit an adequate engineering staff to 
design said project within the specified time limit, and 
at the same time design, construct, and maintain the 
other highways within the State of Utah which the 
Road Commission is required to design, construct, and 
maintain." Among the contract provisions were the 
following: 
"This pi:,oject is part of the Federal-Aid sys-
tem, and as such, it is understood that the plans 
and designs must be approved by the Bureau 
of Public Roads in accordance with the usual 
procedure. The consulting engineer will coop-
erate with the Bureau of Public Roads at all 
times through the Road Commission, and will 
furnish such data, estimates, plans, breakdown 
of quantities, etc., as may be required from time 
to time by the Bureau of Public Roads which 
4 
will transmit such requests through the Road 
Commission" ( R. 62, Item le). 
Contract Item 11 ( R. 62) required the joint ven-
ture to prepare general and detailed features of the 
location of the project together with standard draw-
ings, standard specifications and other similar data 
furnished or to be furnished by the Road Commission, 
"or as may be modified from time to time and all in 
accordance with the approved methods of AASMO 
design criteria and the standards the Bureau of Public 
Roads shall apply." 
"All surveys, designs, plans, schedules, prog-
ress and supervision will be subject to the ap-
proval of the director of the highways of the 
Road Commission." (I tern I le, R. 63). 
In Item IV (R. 65) of the contract the Road 
Commission agreed to: 
"Furnish to the Consulting Engineer, de-
partment standards, specifications, and regula-
tions of the Road Commission applying to proj-
ects of a similar nature and other available 
information including preliminary plans, survey 
data, photogrammetric maps, estimates, and 
other such data prepared for this project;** * " 
The Road Commission was also to guaranty ac-
cess to lands deemed necessary for the performance 
of the consulting engineer's work; provide printing 
and reproduction of construction contract documents; 
provide cloth layout sheets for the preparation of final 
plans; give full consideration to all sketches, estimates, 
5 
working drawings, specifications, proposals, and other 
documents laid before it by the consulting engineer; 
and "inform the Consulting Engineer of its decision 
within a reasonable time so as not to interrupt or delay 
the work of the Consulting Engineer" (R. 65). 
The consulting engineer agreed to accept as "Final 
compensation" for all services outlined in Paragraphs 
I through V a percentage fee equaling 3.45% of the 
total construction cost, but not exceeding $862,500. 
Paragraph Vle provided for additional compen-
sation for services "beyond the scope" of Item II, or 
"if the Consulting Engineer is required to perform 
extra services or make changes in work already satis-
factorily performed in accordance with the direction 
of the Road Commission." But the paragraph contained 
no provision for additional compensation as a result 
of delays, and Paragraph IXd of the General Condi-
tions ( R. 69) provided: 
"The consulting engineer agrees to prosecute 
the work continuously and diligently, and that 
no charges or claims for damages will be made 
by them for any delay or hindrances, of any 
cause whatsoever, during the progress of anJJ 
portion of services specified in this agreement. 
Such delays or hindrances, if any, shall be com-
pensated for by an extension of time for such 
reasonable period that the Road Commission 
may decide." (Emphasis added.) 
An examination of the contract makes it apparent 
that the work to be performed by the joint venture 
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required submission of numerous plans and drawings 
to the Road Commission, and its submission of them 
in turn to the Bureau of Public Roads. Approval could 
not be expected to be automatic; reworking and resub-
mission of plans and drawings must have been antici-
pated by the parties. 
It took the joint venture three years to complete 
the contract, after which it claimed its increased time 
for performance was caused by the Road Commission's 
failure to process various preliminary designs, plans, 
and drawings within a reasonable time; its slowness 
in determining clearances of structures over railroads; 
and the inability of the Road Commission and Bureau 
of Public Roads to "come to decisions" (R. 152, 169-
171). 
The joint venture has recognized that there was 
no single, long-continued delay. The affidavit of Mr. 
J. R. Neville, annexed to the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment set out at least four separate in-
stances, and pointed out that there were various delays 
with respect to designs of the 37 structures included 
in the contract (R. 151-152). That the joint venture 
is relying upon a number of individual and unrelated 
delays, rather than a single one, is also borne out by 
the affidavit of Jack Leonard, annexed to the appel-
lants' motion (R. 168-175). 
There is a dispute with respect to responsibility 
for the various delays. A memorandum from David 
L. Sargent, the Road Commission's chief structural 
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engineer, with respect to approval of structure designs 
is annexed to Mr. Sargent's affidavit in support of 
respondent's motion for summary judgment (R. 102-
105). It is apparent that there are disputes concerning 
a number of factual matters surrounding individual 
delays over a long period of time, some of which are 
claimed to be the responsibility of the joint venture 
and some of the Road Commission; and that the dispute 
sought to be litigated in this action is the very kind 
the parties sought to avoid by including a provision 
in the contract that the Consulting Engineer would not 
be entitled to charges or damages for delays "from any 
h 
,, 
cause w atsoever. 
After the case had been set for trial, it became 
apparent that the basis for appellants' claim for extra 
compensation for delays should be ascertained prior 
to trial. Accordingly, a pre-trial conference was held 
at which appellants conceded they had no evidence 
that the Road Commission had exercised any "fraud, 
malice or wilful intent to delay the plaintiff in the 
completion of the contract" (R. 53), which left for 
determination only the question of whether the various 
delays, added together, could be deemed to be so "un-
reasonable" that the "no damage" clause would not 
apply to them. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS' HECOVERY FOR DELAYS 
IS PRECLUDED BY THE "NO DAl\ilAGE" 
CLAUSE. 
The basic dispute between appellants and respond-
ent is over construction of Paragraph IXd of the 
General Conditions of the contract: 
"The Consulting Engineer [appellants] agrees 
to prosecute the work continuously and dili-
gently, and that no charges or claims for damages 
will be made by them for any delay or hindrances, 
of any cause whatsoever, during the progress of 
any portion of services specified in this agree-
ment. Such delays or hindrances, if any, shall be 
compensated for by an extension of time for such 
reasonable period that the Road Commission 
may decide." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellants contend that the paragraph is "ambiguous" 
and that a trial should be had at which a judge or jury 
could take evidence as to what the parties intended. 
Respondent takes the positon that the paragraph's 
meaning-though broad-is plain. 
"No damage" clauses of varying breadth and sever-
ity have been used and litigated for many years. By 
far the greater number of courts hold them to be valid 
and enforceable, and to preclude recovery of extra com-
pensation or damages for delays encountered during 
contract performance. Although a few jurisdictions 
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have held the provisions inapplicable in special types of 
cases, respondent has been unable to find a single case 
awarding damages under circumstances analogous to 
those relied upon by appellants. 
In an early case this court held damages for delays 
were not recoverable under a contract providing only 
for an extension of time for delays, even though a "no 
damage" stipulation was not included. In a later case 
the court applied a "no damage" clause to prevent 
recovery of damages from delays resulting from actions 
of a third party. 
The first case was Russell v. Bothwell & Swaner 
Co., et al., 57 Utah 362, 194 Pac. 1109 (1920), involv-
ing an agreement between a subcontractor and a prime 
contractor which contained a provision that if the sub-
contractor was delayed in the completion or prosecution 
of the work: 
"By the act, neglect, or default of the owner 
or by any damage caused by fire or other casualty 
for which the (sub }contractor is not responsible, 
or by general strike or lockout caused by acts of 
employees, beyond the control of the (sub }con-
tractor, then the time herein specified for the 
completion of the work may be extended for a 
period equivalent to the time lost by reason of 
any or all of the causes aforesaid * * * " 
The trial court awarded damages to the subcon-
tractor on the ground that the prime contractor, by 
itself delaying the work, had failed to perform the con-
ditions of the contract. 
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This court reversed, taking the view that the 
parties intended the prescribed remedy to be the sole 
remedy for delay. The court said: 
"There is no testimony that the delay was the 
result of fraudulent, malicious, capricious, or 
unreasonable acts or conduct on the part of the 
defendant compa,ny to delay or harass the plain-
tiff in the prosecution of the work. On the con-
trary, the testimony tends to show that it was 
the earnest desire of defendant company that the 
work be prosecuted with all reasonable dispatch. 
The legal question therefore before this court 
for review is: can the plaintiff, by reason of the 
provisions of the contract, recover for the loss 
of time or delay caused by said defendant?" 
The answer was "no." The decision is precedent 
in this case because the contract was construed as if it 
contained a "no damage" clause, and the limitation on 
recovery was held to be binding in the absence of fraud 
or wilful conduct for the purpose of delaying or hinder-
ing the other party, no such conduct having been claimed 
by the appellants in this case. 
The second case, Corporation of President of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Hartford Acci-
dent and indemnity Co., et al., 98 Utah 297, 95 P.2d 
736 ( 1939), involved a contract provision that the 
church would not be held responsible for damage in-
curred through the fault of any other contractor em-
ployed by it and that should the contractor be delayed 
in the prosecution of the work by reason of the above 
cause, or through the owner, the time of completion 
11 
shall be extended for a period equivalent to the time 
lost. 
The contractor sought damages from the church 
because of delays resulting from the failure of another 
contractor to provide materials as needed. In construing 
the "no damage" clause, this court did not question 
either the scope of the clause or length of the delay, 
but said: 
"As between Child & Co. and the Church these 
provisions constitute an agreement by Child & 
Co. not to sue the Church for damages due to 
delay caused by another contractor, its remedy 
being to secure an extension of time in order to 
avoid liability for failure timely to complete the 
work. In certain old decisions courts have held 
that an agreement not to sue could not be set up 
as a defense to an action for damages. If the 
party did sue and obtained damages, the party 
he ~greed not to sue could only sue for the breach 
of the contract not to sue, and could recover 
back the damages and other costs incurred be-
cause of suit. But disregarding an agreement 
not to sue results in circuity and multiplicity of 
actions which we shall avoid by denying Child 
& Co.'s action against the Church. * * * " 
A great majority of the courts in other jurisdictions 
have held "no damage" clauses to preclude recovery of 
damages for delays. 
Psaty & Fuhrman, Inc., v. Housing Authority 
of the City of Providence, 76 R.1. 87, 68 A.2d 32, 10 
A.L.R.2d 789 ( 1949), is a well-reasoned case pointing 
12 
out the anomaly of applying a "no damage" clause 
only to delays which may be said to be "reasonable." 
The action was brought by a contractor against the 
housing authority for damages resulting from author-
ity's having unreasonably hindered or delayed the con-
tractor's performance. The court did not regard the 
length of the delays or their effect on performance as 
material to its decision, saying: 
"The no damage clause in this contract ex-
pressly states that the contractor shall not recover 
damages because of hindrance or delay from 
any cause in the progress of the work 'whether 
such delay be avoidable or unavoidable.' The 
language of this provision, though broad in 
scope, is not ambiguous. As the contract provides 
for an extension of time if requested by the con-
tractor, it is obvious that the object of the clause 
was to protect the Authority in an undertaking 
of such magnitude against the vexatious question, 
in perhaps innumerable instances, whether any 
particular delay could have been reasonably 
avoided by the Authority. Had there been no 
such provision in the contract, the Authority 
would have been liable on the principle of an 
implied covenant if unreasonable delay were 
proven, that is, delay that might reasonably have 
been avoided in carrying out its part of the con-
tract. * * * 
"The contractor in effect argues that the clause 
under consideration means the Authority is 
excusable for reasonable delay only. This con-
struction of the no damage clause would subject 
the Authority to the inquiry in all instances of 
delay whether a reasonable person would have 
13 
acted differently, thus raising the very question 
that the clause intended to avoid. In the absence 
of any claim of concealment, misrepresentation 
or fraud, the contractor by such construction of 
the no damage clause cannot render meaningless 
an express condition of the contract which it 
knowingly and freely accepted. As was observed 
by the Supreme Court in Wells Bros Co. v. 
United States, 254 U.S. 83, at page 87, 41 S. 
Ct. 34, at page 35, 65 L.Ed. 148: 'men who take 
million dollar contracts for government build-
ings are neither un~ophisticated nor careless.' " 
Cunningham Bros. Inc. v. 1'he City of Waterloo, 
254 Iowa 659, 117 N.W.2d 46 (1962), was an action 
brought by a contractor for additional compensation, 
part of which was based upon delays of the city. The 
contract contained two clauses relating to delay: first, 
that in event of specified delays the engineer would 
decide upon the time for completion which would com-
pensate for the delay; second, that the contractor would 
have no right against the city on account of delay in 
prosecution of the work but would have extra time for 
completion. In holding that the contractor could not 
recover in the face of the "no damage" clause the 
Supreme Court of Iowa said: 
"Appellee also attempts to eliminate the 'no 
damage' clause by contending that such clause 
refers only to such delays as were contemplated 
by the parties and that the delay in making the 
site available was not so contemplated. Was the 
failure of the appellant to make the site avail-
able to the appellee on the commencing date 
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such as was contemplated by the parties? \Ve 
think it was. It will be observed that the contract, 
and included docqments, specifically provide that 
any delay upon the part of the appellant, or 
other contractors, shall entitle appellee to such 
extension of time as will compensate for such 
delay. Delays that are known or expected to 
happen would ordinarily be considered in the 
fixing of the dates for starting and completing 
of the work. It is for the purpose of providing 
for situations that may perchance arise that the 
provision for extension of time is included. We 
think it is clear that failure to make the site 
available, assuming such to be the case, comes 
within purview of the parties and entitled ap-
pellee to an extension of time. This it received; 
in fact, two of them. There was full compliance 
with the provisions of the contract in this respect. 
If the instant contract contained no further 
provision relative to delays we might hesitate 
to refuse appellee damages in addition to exten-
sion of time. * * * 
"Paragraph 11, contract, goes further and 
provides, in addition to an allowance of addi-
tional time, that appellee shall have no right of 
action against appellant on account of delays 
in prosecution of the work. This provision was 
known and subscribed to by appellee. While the 
application of such restriction may appear harsh, 
such was the contract entered into by the parties 
and we see no valid reason why it should not 
be enforced." 
In Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800 (1939), a contractor 
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had brought an action against .Massachusetts to recover 
the balance due under a written contract for bridge 
construction and for damages for delays resulting from 
action of the Commonwealth. The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, in holding the contractor could 
not recover, said: 
"The article must be construed in reference 
to all the remaining provisions of the written 
contract of which it forms a part. * * * The 
article in question, must be read in connection 
with Clause 3 of the contract, which imposes 
upon the contractor the risk of 'all expenses in-
curred by or in consequence of the suspension, 
or discontinuance of the work.' It cannot be 
contended that these words were added heed-
lessly or with the intent that they be ignored. 
* * * 
"The contract was executed upon March 5, 
1935. The work was to commence immediately 
upon the execution of the contract and was to 
continue without cessation until completed. The 
parties must have contemplated that there might 
be delay in commencement of the work and they 
agreed that in that event the petitioner should 
be given such additional time for completion as 
the engineers should determine was just, but it 
was specifically provided that the petitioner 
should have no claim for damages on account 
of such delay. Such a provision negatives any 
pecuniary compensation for delay. [Citing 
cases] * * * 
"The petitioner did not introduce any evidence 
showing the reasons or causes for any of .the 
delays alleged in its petition. The charactenza-
16 
tion of the action of the Department of Public 
Works as negligent, unreasonable, or due to in-
d~~ision is not enough to avoid the pertinent pro-
v1s10ns of the contract. The respondent or the 
officials in charge of the work are not charged 
with arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent action, 
nor with acting in bad faith, or under such gross 
mistake as to be tantamount to fraud. * * *" 
The Hosmer case was cited with approval in 
Coleman Bros. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 307 Mass. 
205, 29 N.E.2d 832 (1940); and Charles P. Main, Inc. 
v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 347 Mass. ll8, 
196 N.E.2d 821 (1964). The latter case dealt with a 
design contract under which engineers sought damages 
for delay. The contract contained a "no damage" clause, 
with respect to which the court said: 
"A provision like Article 20 [no damage 
clause} seems less appropriate in an engineer's 
contract than in a construction contract. Never-
theless, the parties have included it and we must 
give it proper effect. 'Ve do not perceive any 
adequate basis for concluding that any other 
interpretation is more reasonable than the nat-
ural meaning of the language. * * * 
"We do not find convincing Main' s contention 
that the Hosmer case is distinguishable because 
the contract in that case contained the provision 
that the contractor would receive the specified 
compensation as 'total compensation for every-
thing * * * done * * * under this contract.' The 
Main contract, read as a whole, to us has the 
same import. We also do not think that there 
is any basis in the language of Article 20 for 
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saying that it applies only to the design phase 
of the work. If that had been the intention it 
should have been so stated." ' 
The court's later statement that the contractor "at 
least" could not recover for delays "not caused by the 
Authority or not unreasonable in length", is not a hold-
ing, since the court was reviewing findings of an auditor 
that the delays were not in fact caused by the Authority, 
and were not unreasonable. There is no suggestion that 
the court meant to modify Hos1ner. 
In Manerud v. City of Eugene, 62 Ore. 196, 124 
Pac. 662 (1912), the plaintiff sought to recover, de-
spite a "no damage" clause, for delays resulting from 
a number of causes, among them failure to obtain rights 
of way, furnish suitable plans or specifications, set 
stakes, and have an engineer on the ground to give 
the contractor information and direction from time to 
time; ordering frequent changes; mistakes in lines and 
grades; neglect in furnishing estimates; and failure to 
pay. Plaintiffs contended that cited acts of the city 
delayed canal work until mid-November, after which 
a flood rendered it impossible to proceed until mid-
April of the next year, but the court denied recovery, 
saymg: 
"The essence of plaintiffs' grievance, as stated, 
is that the city entirely failed to comply with 
part of its contract and was dilatory in what it 
did perform. Without going into elaborate de-
tail which would be necessary in a minute con-
sideration of the plaintiffs' numerous objections, 
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we must content ourself with some general ob-
servations upon the construction proper to be 
given to the contract involved. 
"Under its terms mere delay of the city con-
stitut.es no ground for damage. It only extends 
the time for the plaintiff to complete the work 
within the discretion of the engineer, for the con-
tract itself stipulates thus: 'The Contractor shall 
not be entitled to damages on account of delay, 
but if such delay be occasioned by the city, the 
Contractor shall be entitled to an extension of 
time in which to complete the work, to be de-
termined by the engineer.' " 
In Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, 
Snohomish County, 13 Wash.2d 398, 125 P.2d 275 
( 1942) , a contractor sought damages arising out of 
construction on a high school building. The trial court 
ruled in favor of the school district and the contractor 
appealed. The contract under which action was 
brought contained a provision, similar to the one in 
the present case, that "the contractor shall not be en-
titled to any claim for damages on account of hin-
drances or delays from any cause whatsoever," but 
would not be entitled to an extension of time where 
delays were caused by an act of God or any act or 
omission on the part of the owner. In construing the 
"no damage" provision, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington said : 
"The decisive question in this case, therefore, 
is whether, under a contract containing such a 
provision, the contractor should nevertheless be 
permitted to maintain an action against the 
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owner for breach of contract, upon a showing 
that the work was retarded and rendered more 
difficult and expensive because of failure on 
the part of the supervising architect to make 
necessary corrections in the plans and specifica-
tions in a timely manner; or whether, on the con-
trary, the contractor's sole remedy is to seek an 
extension of time for the completion of the work 
* * * " 
The court recognized the general rule that where 
one party delays another in the performance of a con-
tract, there is a breach of an implied agreement, but 
added that where 
"the contract expressly precludes the recov-
ery of damages by the contractor for delay caused 
by the default of the owner, that provision will 
be given effect. [Citing numerous cases. J * * * 
"The language of such preclusive provision 
is, however, usually given a strict construction 
because of the harsh results which may flow from 
the enforcement thereof. But when it is clear that 
a given result comes within the terms of such a 
provision, the mere fact that the result is a harsh 
one will not prevent the application of the rule. 
'Vhether a given contract provision precludes 
the recovery of damages in accordance with the 
rule just announced depends upon the particu-
lar language in which it is cast, the nature of the 
default involved, and the various other circum-
stances of the case. 
"The specific provision here in question states 
positively that the contractor shall not be entitled 
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to anlJ claim for damages on account of hin-
drances or delays from any cause whatsoever. 
* * * 
. "Wholly aside from his failure (to give no-
tices) , he was in any event precluded by the 
expres_s terms of his contract from maintaining 
an action for damages resulting from hindrances 
and delays. * * * 
"The probability of the occurrence of delays 
was clearly foreseen by the parties to this action, 
as the language of the contract repeatedly dis-
closes, and they specifically provided that the 
contractor's remedy therefore should take the 
form of an extension of time. * * * " (Emphasis 
added.) 
Humphreys v. J. B. Michael & Co., Inc, 341 
S.\V.2d 229 (Ky. 1960), involved a contract in 
which there were a number of provisions relating to 
delay. The contractor claimed there was "active inter-
ference" on the part of the owner, but the Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky held that active interference 
could not be established in the absence of an order from 
the owner directing the contractor to keep men and 
equipment on the job during periods of delay. There 
is nothing in the present case to suggest "active inter-
ference" such as in Humphreys and in American Bridge 
Co. v. State, 245 App. Div. 535, 283 N.Y.S. 577 (1935). 
Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Hubbell, 
325 S.W.2d 880, (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), was a prolix 
case in which the contractor sought damages for a 
great number of delays. The court held that in order 
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to recover for delays in the face of a general "no dam-
age" clause, it is necessary to show intentional and wil-
ful acts calculated to cause harm, done with an unlawful 
purpose of causing harm, and without right or justi-
fiable cause. It allowed some claims for damages where 
the wilfulness issue was properly submitted to the jury, 
but reversed others where it was not. 
In addition to supporting the other precedents, 
the case illustrates the complexity of the problems 
sought to be avoided by "no damage" clauses, and points 
out that in proving damages for delays a contractor 
must offer proof with respect to each delay, its cause, 
and the damage resulting from it, not package all the 
separate delays together as appellants have tried to do 
in this case. 
For half a century the United States Supreme 
Court has been considering cases involving contract 
clauses tending to protect the government against 
claims of damages for delays, and quite consistently 
has been rejecting contentions that the contract pro-
visions, for one reason or another should not be ap-
plied. In an early case, Wells Bros. Co. of New York 
vs. United States, 254 U.S. 83, 41 S.Ct. 34, 65 L.Ed. 
148 ( 1920), a contractor claimed damages for delays 
resulting from a change made by the government in 
type of construction material, and suspension of the 
work pending adoption of legislation which would affect 
the final design of the building. The contract contained 
the clause: 
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" * * * No claim shall be made or allowed to 
the contractor for any damages which may arise 
out of any delay caused by the United States." 
In holding the contractor could not recover dam-
ages for delay, the court said: 
"Such language, disassociated as it is from 
provisions relating to 'omissions from,' the work 
to be done, or 'materials' to be used, cannot be 
treated as meaningless and futile and read out 
of the contract. Given its plain meaning, it is 
fatal to the appellant's claim." 
In H. E. Crook Co., Inc. v. United States, 270 
U.S. 4, 70 L.Ed. 348, 46 S. Ct. 194 (1926), a con-
tractual provision for an extension of time was con-
strued to be the contractor's only remedy for delays. 
Moreover the court held that even though the contract 
fixed the contractor's time for performance "very 
strictly", this did not impose an obligation on the gov-
ernment with respect to times for performance. 
In United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61, 87 L.Ed. 
53, 63 S.Ct. 120 (1942), the court's examination of 
various contract clauses led it to the conclusion that 
performance dates set out in the contract were tentative 
and subject to modification. 
In United States v. Howard P. Foley Co., 329 
U.S. 64, 91 L.Ed. 44, 67 S. Ct. 154, (1946), the court 
again was asked to construe a contract as not prohibit-
ing damages for delays, but it refused, noting that the 
question in all of the cases was whether the government 
had obligated itself to pay damages to a contractor 
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because of delay in making the work available, and held 
again that it had not "for the reasons elaborated in 
the Crook and Rice decisions." The court also held that 
the obligation placed upon the contractor to perform 
within a certain time could not be inverted into a war-
ranty that areas would be available in time to permit 
the contractor to so perform. 
In none of the above decisions were "the specific 
delays" contemplated by the parties any more than in 
the instant case, and they cannot be distinguished on 
that ground. 
Other cases upholding "no damage" clauses are 
McDaniel v. Ashton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511, (9 
Cir. 1966); American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Harbor 
Comt. Co., 51 \Vash. 2d 258, 317 P2d 521 ( 1958) and 
Gherardi v. Board of Education, 53 N.J. Super 349, 
147 A.2d 535 (1958). 
Some courts have held "no damage" clauses, even 
some stated in rather broad terms, not to apply to par-
ticular fact situations. The New York courts appear 
to have gone further than any other jurisdiction per-
mitting recovery despite "no damage" clauses. In 
addition to permitting recovery, like other courts if 
there has been "active interference," a number of deci-
sions by New York's lower and intermediate courts 
have permitted recovery where work has been suspended 
for so long a time that a contractor would have been 
justified in abandoning the contract. The idea came 
from People ex rel. Wells & Newton Co. of New York 
24 
v. Craig, 232 N.Y. 125, 133 N.E. 419 (1921), which 
didn't involve a dispute between the contractor and the 
"owner." It was a mandamus action to compel the 
eontroller of New York City to pay a claim under 
a contract with the Board of Education, the Board 
having agreed with the contractor, after a three-year 
delay attributable to the Board, to take steps toward 
payment of the contractor for delays and have him 
complete the contract. The Board's delay was found 
to have been so unreasonable as to constitute an aban-
donment of the contract, thereby authorizing the Board 
to enter into a new contract under which it could agree 
to pay at a different rate than provided in the old 
contract. 
The later New York cases have retained the 
rationale of the WellY & Newton Co. case and have not 
allowed recovery for delays merely because they were 
"unreasonable"; the delay must have been so long that 
the contractor would have been justified in abandoning 
the contract. And this concept implies a long-continued 
interruption of work-when substantial contract per-
formance was not going on-not an accumulation of 
relatively minor periods converted into an "unreason-
able" delay by the use of an adding machine. 
Ace Stone, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 47 N.J. 431, 
221 A.2d 515 (1966), and McGuire & Hester v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 113 Cal.App.2d 186, 247 
P.2d 934 (1952), proceeded on yet another theory, 
that the delays for which damages were sought were 
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not the kinds of delays contemplated by the "no dam-
age" clause. But in each of these cases there were 
special facts which motivated the decision. 
In Ace Stone, negotiations leading to the contract 
were important inasmuch as during them the Town-
ship's engineer had represented that easements would 
be acquired before notice to proceed was given, and that 
the contractor should start with sufficient equipment 
to keep three crews busy at three separate sites. In 
light of these negotiations and a contract clause which 
reasonably could be interpreted as referring only to 
delays occurring after the work had begun, the court 
held that there was a fact issue as to whether the "no 
damage" clause was meant to apply to delays resulting 
from an antecedent failure to obtain easements. 
In the California case of McGuire & Hester v. 
City & County of San Francisco, supra, 113 Cal. App. 
2d 186, 247 P.2d 934 (1952), the decision limiting ap-
plication of the "no damage" clause was based upon a 
technical construction of portions of the contract. The 
"no damage" clause referred to delays, "whether un-
avoidable or avoidable," and another paragraph of the 
contract defined those terms in such a way that the 
delay for which damages were sought did not seem to 
be included in either of them. 
In Ace Stone and McGuire and Hester there was 
room for interpretation, but the "no damage" clause 
used in the contract between the joint venture ancl 
the Road Commission is stated in the broadest pos-
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sible terms. It says plainly, unequivocally, and without 
qualification that the contractor shall not be entitled 
to damages for delays "for any cause whatsoever," and 
such clauses have usually been applied as written. On 
the basis of their vast, well-documented experience, 
appellants and their engineers must have known what 
delays might be encountered in the design of a com-
plicated interstate highway system. Nevertheless they 
agreed to a provision in which they were to be com-
pensated for delays only by extensions of time-not 
money. 
Many cases dealing with the problems are found 
in the annotation, "Validity, construction, and appli-
cation of 'no damage' clause with respect to delay in 
construction contract," 10 ALR 2d 801 et seg. The 
cases deal with construction contracts, and those allow-
ing recovery in certain situations might be distinguish-
able for the reason that contractors are precluded from 
utilizing their equipment on other projects during the 
delay, while design engineers should be able to shift 
their efforts without too many problems. But even with-
out such a distinction, none of the cases has allowed 
recovery for a sum total of accumulated separate delays. 
II 
THERE WAS NO DISPUTE CONCERNING 
ANY MATERIAL FACT, AND THE SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY EN-
TERED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS. 
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Respondent is in agreement with the rule, well 
recognized by this court, that a summary judgment 
should not be granted where there is any genuine issue 
as to any material farct. However, the trial court in 
this case decided what is essentially a law question: 
the meaning of a written contract which contains an 
integration clause to the effect that the writing con-
stitutes the entire agreement ( R. 70, Par IXk). Where 
the meaning of such a contract is clear, extrinsic facts 
are not needed to find the "intention of the parties". 
As stated by this court in Jensen's Used Cars v. 
Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 ( 1958): 
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts 
we seek to determine the intentions of the parties. 
But it is also elementary and of extreme prac-
tical importance that we hold contracting parties 
to their clear and understandable language de-
liberately committed to writing and endorsed 
by them as signatories thereto. 'Vere this not 
so business, one with another among our citizens, 
would be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic 
purpose of the law to supply enforceable rules 1 
of conduct for the maintenance and improve-
ment of an orderly society's welfare and prog-
ress would find itself impotent. It is not un- ' 
reasonable to hold one responsible for language 
which he himself espouses. Such language is the 
only implement he gives us to fashion a deter-
mination as to the intentions of the parties. 
Under such circumstances we should not be 
required to embosom any request that we ignore 
that very language. This is as it should be. The 
rule excluding matters outside the four cornen 
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of a clear, understandable document, is a fair 
one, and one's contentions concerning his intent 
should extend no further than his own clear ex-. ,, 
press10n. 
If there is any ambiguity in the contract, the am-
biguity does not appear in the "no damage" clause 
itself, which purports to cover all delays, from what-
ever causes. Appellants, therefore, must claim an 
ambiguity arises out of other contractual provisions 
and the circumstances surrounding negotiation of the 
eontract. But such a claim, because of the undisputed 
facts, cannot create a genuine issue as to any fact ma-
terial to construction of the contract. Appellants have 
stipulated that their case does not have elements of 
fraud, malicious, or wilful acts stated by this court to 
be necessary in Russell v. Bothwell & Swaner Co. et al., 
supra, 57 Utah 362, 194 Pac. ll09. Their main con-
tentions are (I) that the delays, cumulatively, were 
"unreasonable," and ( 2) that the delays were not of 
the kind contemplated by the parties. 
But there was no long interruption of work which 
would justify abandonment of the contract, as there 
must be even under the decisions of the courts of New 
York, which seems to be the only state embracing the 
doctrine of "reasonableness." 
The parol evidence rule precludes appellants from 
proving by extrinsic evidence that the delays intended 
to be covered by the "no damage" clause were anything 
other than "any delay or hindrance, of any cause what-
soever." But assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
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extrinsic facts may be considered, appellants l.uu.t lWt 
suggested the exi~tence of any facts which would sup-
port the interpretation they espouse. The court would 
be required to look at the entire contract and the nego-
tiations between the parties to determine the kinds of 
delays contemplated by the "no damage" clause. 
The appellants' proposal, and the contract, establish 
that delays encountered were the result of problems 
the parties knew about and were concerned about. 
Consider the following undisputed facts: 
The joint venture was experienced and knowledge-
able in the design and construction of interstate high-
way systems. It must have anticipated the kinds of 
delays that might affect its progress. 
The proposal submitted by the joint venture 
promised to complete the project "within nine months 
after notice to proceed, provided there is not more than 
a two-week interval between submission of the vario1tS 
phases of design and approval of the above designs 
by the Utah Road Commission and the Bureau of Public 
Roads." (Emphasis added.) 
The final fee was stated to be 3.45% or the esti- ' 
mated construction cost, and there was not even a hint 
that the fee was conditional upon the speed of approval 
or the date of completion. 
The agreement entered into by the parties referred 
to the inadequacy of the engineering staff of the Road 
Commission; and that the engineer was qualified, ready, 
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aLlc, and willing to assist the Road Commission in 
designing the project. 
The agreement expressly provided that decisions 
with respect to plans and designs would be subject 
to approval of the Bureau of Public Roads. 
Modifications in the plans and specifications "from 
time to time" were contemplated by Item II of the 
coutract, "Control of the Work." 
All surveys, designs, plans, schedules, progress 
and supervision were to be subject to the approval of 
the Director of Highways. 
The engineering fee provided in the contract was 
for "all services" and was to be "final compensation" 
for the services provided in the contract." 
Contractual provision for extra payments related 
only to work "beyond the scope" of the contract work, 
and to changes in connection with work already satis-
factorily performed, without mention of delays. 
Finally, if contemporaneous construction is rele-
vant, the joint venture asked for and received extensions 
of time for performance, the last request having been 
made on June 29, 1960, (R. 98), more than 18 months 
later than date by which appellants now claim the con-
tract should have been completed. 
Despite its own proposal and the express contract 
provisions the joint venture now contends that there 
are some facts, somewhere, to establish that the delays 
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were "unreasonable" and not contemplated by the 
parties. \¥ e admit the contract took much longer to 
perform than contract schedule provided. But appel-
lants have not pointed to anything that occurred during 
the negotiations, such as was ref erred to in the Ace 
Stone, case, which misled the joint venture; or to any 
unusual circumstances; nor to any contemporaneous 
construction by the parties that would help them. There 
is nothing in any of the affidavits submitted by the 
appellants, nothing in the memorandwn itself (many 
of the assertions in which are supported by affidavits) 
which would bring the case within the operation of any 
of the cases relied upon by appellants. 
The parties contracted specifically with reference 
to the duties of the Road Commission, among which 
was the duty to see that plans and drawings were 
returned to the joint venture within a reasonable time ' 
"so as not to interrupt or delay the work" of the joint 
venture. The possibility of delay from such a cause was 1 
anticipated in the contract, yet the joint venture also 
agreed that in event of delays, from any cause what- 1 
soever, a claim for damages would not be made. Delay 
problems described in the contract must have been , 
understood by the parties to be within the realm of 
possibility. 
III 
THE STATE OF UTAH IS NOT OBLI-
GATED TO PAY INTEREST ON ANY 
AMOUNTS FOUND TO BE DUE. 
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Inasmuch as the trial court disposed of the case 
on the ground that there was no valid claim against 
the Road Commission, the obligation of the State of 
Utah to pay interest on a claim such as this was not 
ruled upon by the trial court. It may be hypothetical 
here. 
That a state's obligation to pay interest is limited 
is well-recognized. As stated in 49 Am. J ur., States, 
Territories and Dependencies, § 75, p. 286: 
"It is a well settled rule that a state is not 
liable for a payment of interest on its debts 
unless so bound by an act of the legislature or 
by a lawful contract of its administrator or 
executive officers made within the scope of their 
duly constituted authority. The state is liable 
to pay interest only as it has bound itself by 
contract to do so. * * * The rule applies to all 
kinds of obligations of and claims against the 
state. * * * " 
And in § 15 of the same article: 
"Since the state is not liable for the payment 
of interest on claims against it unless it has as-
sumed such a liability, it does not become bound 
for a payment of interest under a general statute 
imposing liability for interest." 
Utah seems never to have passed directly on the 
question of the obligation to pay interest under a general 
statute. 
Only once has a case involving interest payment 
by the State of Utah faced our Supreme Court. How-
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ever, in State v. Danielson, 247 P.2d 900, 122 Utah 220 , 
the question of liability of the State for interest was 
not the issue, the parties having agreed that the de-
fendant was entitled to recover interest in a condem-
nation action. The court cited Oregon S.L.R. Company 
v. Jones et al., 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732, and Salt Lake 
and U. R. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90, as 
a basis for this liability. These latter cases established 
liability for interest in condemnation actions but did 
not involve the State or a public agency. 
The closest cases which might favor plaintiff in 
its claim for interest herein are Baker Lumber Corn-
pany v. A. A. Clark Company, et al., 53 Utah 336, , 
178 Pac. 764, and Auerbach v. Salt Lake County, 23 
Utah 103, 63 Pac. 907. These cases involved a school 
district and a county. However, in both instances they 
also involved interest-bearing warrants in which the 
school district and county agreed to pay interest to the 
obligees. 
As suggested in appellants' brief, some decisions 
have held the state to be liable for interest. But most 
do not. One such case is Culver v. Commonwealth, 348 
Pa. 472, 35 A.2d 64 ( 1944), in which a general interest 
statute was held not to apply to the state in a condem-
nation proceeding. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants' desire to obtain additional revenue is 
understandable, but it shouldn't be fulfilled in such a 
way as to make scriveners psychotic. If various specific 
eauses of delay had been catalogued in an appendix 
to the contract, appellants no doubt would have been 
able to find some delay that wasn't on the list. The 
eontract having referred to all delays, "of any cause 
whatsoever," appellants contend that it should only 
apply to delays "contemplated by the parties", and 
should not be held to mean what it plainly says. 
If "no damage" clauses are valid (which they are 
uniformly held to be), and in a given case the partie~ 
want to provide the exclusive remedy with respect tc 
all delays, some language should be available by which 
they can do. Must they add an "absolutely"? 
There is no rule of law, morality, or public policy 
that requires appellants to be paid for delays in per-
formance, when they had solemnly agreed that such 
delays were to be compensated for solely by an exten-
sion of time. This is particularly true where their pro-
posal to the Road Commission, by its own express 
terms, made delays material only to appellants' time 
of performance. 
The contract is written. It is not ambiguous. There 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact. And the 
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contract precludes recovery by the appellants of any 
damages for delays. The judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County should be affirmed. 
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